2016 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

4-13-2016

Adel Mikhaeil v. Angel Santos

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016

Recommended Citation
"Adel Mikhaeil v. Angel Santos" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 374.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/374

This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

CLD-204

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-2932
___________
ADEL MIKHAEIL,
Appellant
v.

ANGEL SANTOS; PHILLIP P.G. WEBB; DEALREE BROADY;
CRISTINO FELIX; JERSEY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT;
MARY REINKE; HUDSON COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE;
MYLES CAPPIELLO; NEIL HICKEY; NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE;
PAULA DOW, formerly Ann Milgram, Office of the Attorney General;
STATE OF NEW JERSEY; ANTHONY PICCONE, Deputy Attorney General;
MICHAELANGELO CONTE; RENEEA ROSE SIBAYIAN;
JERSEY JOURNAL, INC.; JOHN DOE(S) 1 THROUGH 10
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 2:10-cv-03876)
District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 31, 2016
Before: FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 13, 2016)

_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
Adel Mikhaeil appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey in his action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As the appeal does
not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the decision of the District
Court.
The procedural history of this case and the details of Mikhaeil’s claims are well
known to the parties, set forth in the District Court’s memoranda, and need not be
discussed at length. Briefly, in August 2008, Mikhaeil was arrested by police in Jersey
City, New Jersey and charged with witness tampering and making terroristic threats
against Angel Santos. Ultimately, the charges were dismissed. In July 2010, Mikhaeil
filed a complaint under § 1983, raising claims arising from the arrest. Named as
defendants were the complaining witness, Angel Santos; the Jersey City Police
Department and several of its officers (“Jersey City Police Defendants”); the Hudson
County Prosecutor’s Office, the prosecuting attorney, and another employee of that
Office (“HCPO Defendants”); the State of New Jersey, the State Police, the State
Attorney General, and individual state agents (“State Defendants”); and the Jersey
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This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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Journal newspaper and several staff members (“Jersey Journal Defendants”).1 During the
course of the proceedings, the Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss and for
summary judgment.
On June 13, 2011, the District Court granted motions to dismiss that had been filed
by the HCPO Defendants, the State Defendants, and the Jersey Journal Defendants,
dismissing the claims against those sets of defendants. The action continued against
Santos and the Jersey City Police Defendants on the remaining claims. On December 14,
2012, the District Court granted the Jersey City Police Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. Thereafter, on December 1, 2014, the District Court dismissed the claims
against Santos, the only remaining defendant. Finally, on July 16, 2015, the District
Court entered a final order in the case dismissing cross-claims that had been raised by the
HCPO Defendants. This timely appeal followed.
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary
review over an order granting summary judgment. DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262, 267
1

In his complaint, Mikhaeil alleged that: the Jersey City Police Department was liable for
his false arrest and imprisonment (Count 1); Officers Myles Cappiello and Neil Hickey
failed to adequately investigate Santos’ complaint before recommending charges (Count
2); Deputy Attorney General Anthony Piccone’s criminal prosecution of Mikhaeil was
improper (Count 3); the Office of the Attorney General failed to adequately train its
employees which resulted in Mikhaeil being deprived of his constitutional rights (Count
4); the Jersey Journal Defendants withheld pertinent information from police and thus,
were also responsible for his false arrest and imprisonment (Count 5); Defendants
Piccone, Hickey, Cappiello and Mary Reinke, an employee in the prosecutor’s office,
worked together to arrest and imprison him in order to procure his guilty plea in another
criminal matter (Count 6).
3

(3d Cir. 2004). Our review of the District Court’s earlier dismissal orders is plenary.
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We may summarily affirm when
an appeal presents us with no substantial question. See LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. Upon
review of the record, and for substantially the same reasons given by the District Court,
we will affirm.
As we noted above, Mikhaeil’s complaint stated claims under § 1983 against
numerous defendants, several of whom moved to dismiss his complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Blanket assertions and
conclusory statements by themselves do not suffice to show plausibility. See Renfro v.
Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2011).
First, the District Court properly dismissed Mikhaeil’s claim against the Hudson
County Prosecutor’s Office. Because that Office is a state agency, not a local
governmental body, it is not a person amenable to suit under § 1983. See Estate of
Lagano v. Bergen Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 769 F.3d 850, 854-55 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding
that New Jersey county prosecutor’s offices are considered state agencies for § 1983
purposes when fulfilling their law enforcement and investigative – as opposed to
administrative – roles). Further, the District Court correctly held that the prosecuting
4

attorney was immune from suit for his role in prosecuting Mikhaeil’s criminal case. See
Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463 (3d Cir. 1992). Additionally, the District
Court correctly dismissed Mikhaeil’s claim against Mary Reinke, an HCPO employee.
Among other things, Mikhaeil did not allege facts establishing that Reinke had the
requisite personal involvement with Mikhaeil’s case. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).2
The District Court also appropriately dismissed Mikhaeil’s claims against the
Jersey Journal Defendants. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a
violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The
Jersey Journal Defendants are private actors—not state actors. Although private
individuals may nonetheless be liable under § 1983 if they have conspired with or
engaged in joint activity with state actors, see Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28
(1980), as the District Court noted, Mikhaeil did not adequately allege the existence of a
conspiracy involving these Defendants to deprive him of his rights.3
Lastly, the District Court did not err in dismissing the State Defendants. Insofar as
they were sued for damages in their official capacities, they are entitled to Eleventh
2

Mikhaeil likewise failed to establish that the Attorney General had any personal
involvement in his case.
3

The District Court also correctly dismissed Defendant Santos from the case on those
grounds.
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Amendment immunity. The Eleventh Amendment protects a state and its employees
from federal suit unless Congress has specifically abrogated the state’s immunity, or the
state has waived its own immunity. Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249,
254 (3d Cir. 2010); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl.-Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 503-04 (3d Cir.
2001). Congress did not abrogate the states’ immunity through the enactment of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, see Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979), and New Jersey has not
waived its immunity in federal court, see Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc. v. Port
Auth., 819 F.2d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Hess v. Port
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994). Therefore, the District Court correctly
concluded that the State Defendants were entitled to Eleventh-Amendment immunity
from Mikhaeil’s official-capacity claims. To the extent that Mikhaeil intended to impose
individual liability on the State Defendants, for the reasons carefully identified by the
District Court in its thorough opinion, those claims were also properly dismissed.4
We now turn to the District Court’s order granting the Jersey City Police
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper where, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all
inferences in favor of that party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
4

Additionally, to the extent Mikhaeil alleged that any of the Defendants violated his
rights under state law, those claims were subject to dismissal because he did not comply
with the notice requirements of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. See N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 59:8-8; Velez v. City of Jersey City, 850 A.2d 1238, 1246 (N.J. 2004).
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party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v.
Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 2006).
First, we conclude that the District Court did not err in granting summary
judgment as to Mikhaeil’s claims against the individual police officers named in the
complaint. To prevail on a claim of false arrest or false imprisonment under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show that he was arrested without probable cause. Groman v. Twp. of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995); accord Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d
136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988) (“The proper inquiry in a section 1983 claim based on false arrest
. . . is not whether the person arrested in fact committed the offense but whether the
arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person arrested had committed the
offense.”). Probable cause exists “whenever reasonably trustworthy information or
circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of
reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been committed by the person being
arrested.” United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002).
For the reasons outlined by the District Court, the record supports the conclusion
that there was sufficient information from which a jury could conclude that there was
probable cause to arrest Mikhaeil for terroristic threats and witness tampering.
Additionally, even if their actions were unreasonable, we would agree with the District
Court that the named officers were entitled to qualified immunity. See Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
7

The District Court also correctly determined that the Jersey City Police
Department was not a proper party to this action. Although local governmental units may
constitute “persons” against whom suit may be lodged under § 1983, a city police
department is a governmental sub-unit that is not distinct from the municipality of which
it is a part. See, e.g., Bonenburger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997);
Johnson v. City of Erie, 834 F. Supp. 873, 878-79 (W.D. Pa. 1993). Even construing
Mikhaeil’s complaint liberally to allege a claim against Jersey City, we conclude that
summary judgment was appropriate. The Supreme Court’s § 1983 jurisprudence
“require[s] a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under
§ 1983 to identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury.”
Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (citing Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). This requires a plaintiff to show
that “through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the
injury alleged.” Id. (emphasis in original). In this case, however, Mikhaeil failed to
allege any action by Jersey City, let alone “deliberate conduct” that would show the City
to be the “moving force” behind Mikhaeil’s alleged injuries.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of District Court.
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